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Lawnet: The Case of the Missing
(Tenth) Amendment
Philip P. Frickey*
April 10, 1990. It was a windy day in Minneapolis. The
blond haired, blue eyed natives were sunbathing in forty-five
degree weather, a sure sign of trouble ahead. I was working
the day watch out of Public Law Division. My boss is Bob
Stein. My sometime partner is Dan Farber. My name's
Frickey. I'm a law professor.
I was investigating the mysterious disappearance of the
tenth amendment. It was there - in the Constitution, I mean
- almost from the start. But nobody was ever really sure
whether it said anything important, and what happened to it. I
decided to take to the stairs and ask my first-year Constitu-
tional Law class whether they had seen it lately, or at all.
So I asked my class when we had last seen the tenth
amendment. Nobody answered. I called on a student. She
started talking about representation reinforcement, and non-
originalism, and normativism, and evolving values, and making
the Constitution the best Constitution it could be, and about
the New Deal as a transformative substitute for a second (or
maybe even a third) Constitutional Convention. Her discussion
of constitutional moments was taking too many minutes.
"Just the facts, ma'am," I said. She didn't have any, just a
lot of law, or what passes for it nowadays.
So I reminded the class that we had seen the tenth amend-
ment, in name or in gubstance, influence the outcome in 7e
Civil Rights Cases' during the fall semester. They looked at
me as if I were speaking Babylonian. So I reminded them
about what that case had held, that under principles of federal-
ism, the Civil Rights Act of 18752 was an unconstitutional at-
* Professor of Law and Julius E. Davis Professor of Law for 1990-91,
University of Minnesota. To their embarrassment, I thank Dan Farber, Geoff
Hathaway, Roger Park, and Gerald Torres for comments on an earlier version
of this ... whatever it is.
1. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2. 18 Stat. 336 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988)).
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tempt by Congress to assume the state's general police power.3
That Justice Harlan - the first one - had written a strong dis-
sent.4 They stared at me as if I had switched from modern to
ancient Babylonian.
So I changed the subject. I asked them whether the tenth
amendment appeared in today's assignment. Somebody mum-
bled that it was involved in National League of Cities v. Usery.5
I asked whether the words "tenth amendment" could be found
in the majority opinion in that case. The silence was deafening.
Somebody said that the photocopied materials we were using
were so poorly copied that you couldn't be certain how to an-
swer the question. The fact that he was right - the copies
were so blurry that they could have provided a rational basis in
Lee Optical 6 - didn't make me any less irritated with him. In
the good old days, before people complained about law profes-
sor brutality, I would have known what to do to that student.
Today, law professors lack the old, effective weapons of hu-
miliation and ridicule. The only weapon I still pack underneath
my coat is my bicentennial pocket copy of the Constitution,
Warren Burger's greatest gift to constitutional law. Some of
these young hotshot law professors carry around those natural-
law, repeating-automatic constitutions imported from overseas,
the ones that hold fifteen implied rights in the clip and one in
the penumbra. I still stick to the tried and true Constitution
my dad used to carry on his beat. I figure if it was good enough
for Hugo Black, it's good enough for me. If you can't nail your
target with the Constitution as written, you belong on some
other detail anyway.7
My mind drifted back to the case at hand. I wish it hadn't.
I asked a fellow what the rationale of National League of Cities
was. He said he didn't much like being rousted by law profes-
sors. I told him that if he didn't answer, he'd have to come up-
stairs to the office and talk to the boss. Another student
volunteered that she respected law professors very much and
would be glad to answer the question. I almost got sick.
I was about ready to drag them all in for questioning when
3. 109 U.S. at 13-15.
4. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
6. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
7. Originally this phrase said "trusts and estates detail," but because that
is the boss's detail (to the extent that deans have a detail anymore), I figured I
had to change it to something else. Any substitution will offend somebody, so
just fill in the blank as you see fit.
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somebody pointed out that all Rehnquist said in National
League of Cities was that our "federal system of government"
prevented Congress from regulating integral operations of
traditional state functions.8 Now we were getting somewhere.
Another student pointed out that the tenth amendment, posi-
tively identified for the last time in the 1930s,9 had reappeared
only briefly as a bugaboo in Brennan's National League of Cit-
ies dissent.'L Excellent. I like it when people find bugaboos in
dissents.
So I asked them what the source of intergovernmental im-
munity was in National League of Cities if it wasn't the tenth
amendment. A student made a comment about implicit struc-
tural protections in the original, pre-Bill of Rights Constitution.
She said that maybe the tenth amendment is a truism, but a
truism that merely reflects the structure of the original Consti-
tution, and so Rehnquist has a legitimate basis for National
League of Cities. Good student. Thorough, careful, smart, dili-
gent, friendly. Make a fine bond lawyer someday." I live for
such rewards from teaching.
The student continued to say some other intelligent things
about National League of Cities, but I cut her off. She was
starting to anticipate the rest of the class, and I still had thirty
minutes to fill. So I asked a different student about Garcia.2
Where did the tenth amendment go there?
The student responded that, just like all the other protec-
tions of states' rights, it got flushed down the toilet by the lib-
eral majority of the Supreme Court. I had forgotten that he
was the president of the Federalist Society. I thought about
suggesting that his sense of who had a majority on the Court
was a little out of date. But why pick a fight with one of the
few students who will state a position and defend it? You need
them around when everybody else is looking walleyed at you
and there is lots of class time left to fill.
So I asked a student to respond to the last comment. She
said that Justice Blackmun had been a very weak fifth vote in
8. 426 U.S. at 852 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, and
Powell, JJ.).
9. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 n.18 (1936).
10. 426 U.S. at 861-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by White, and Mar-
shall, JJ.).
11. Again, if bond lawyering is your detail, just substitute something else
you find funnier. If you can't think of anything that strikes you as funny, you
have lawyered too long.
12. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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National League of Cities, had undermined Rehnquist's opinion
by joining it only on the assumption that it announced a balanc-
ing test, and had simply changed his mind by the time Garcia
came along.13 So Blackmun killed the tenth amendment, I
asked? She said that the tenth amendment was already brain-
dead, Harry had just pulled the plug, and maybe pulling the
plug was especially appropriate because of Harry's Mayo Clinic
days. Another student started to complain that in Roe,14 Black-
mun had done more than just kill an amendment. The first
student cut her off and continued on, saying that constitutional
euthanasia was called for in this instance, because the lower
court cases attempting to follow National League of Cities had
shown that its test was unworkable in practice, even if fine in
theory. That Justice Blackmun was a good guy to admit that
he had been wrong. That the Powell dissent in Garcia15 was so
overblown and nasty that it read like a book review in Consti-
tutional Commentary.
I was again getting nervous, because this student had made
enough intelligent comments to wipe out all the rest of my
class preparation. In the old days, a law professor could rough
up a student who did that, but we're all wimps today, what with
citizen commissions set up to hear complaints about law profes-
sor brutality and all. I thought about calling on the president
of the Federalist Society to respond to the student, for I was
sure that her crack about Powell's dissent must have infuriated
him. But all this talk wasn't getting us anywhere.
So I told the class to consider three possibilities: the tenth
amendment was dead; it was just on a short vacation, pending
another Republican appointment to the Court; or it was travel-
ing incognito and performing minor acts of sabotage against
congressional hegemony. I had no idea what the last thing
meant, but it sounded good at the time, and might suggest that
I had read some dead European authors. Anyway, I asked the
class to go to the library and see whether they could find any-
thing left of the tenth amendment after Garcia.
At lunch the day watch went over the morning's reports.
We noted the recurrence of obnoxious behavior by two col-
leagues and three omnipresent students. We agreed to be on
the lookout for whoever ripped the ACLU bumper sticker off a
13. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
14. Everybody knows.
15. 469 U.S. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, and
O'Connor, JJ.).
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colleague's door. And we agreed to roust students to buy tick-
ets to the professors' ball. It was a rewarding, collegial lunch.
I figured that because I had 100 people looking for the
tenth amendment, I could take the rest of the day off from the
case and spend my time instead on the obscure scholarship in
which the Public Law Division specializes. The next day in
class I was happy to see that many of the students had taken
the assignment seriously. Essentially, they had three different
theories about what had happened to the tenth amendment.
The first one was that the poor sucker had been snuffed
out and buried under some big union-made construction pro-
ject, like a football stadium in New Jersey. Now, I'm no states'
rights guy, but it gave me pause to think that a contract hit had
been made on a constitutional amendment. According to these
students, the last reported sighting of the tenth amendment oc-
curred in a restaurant in Detroit, where it was having lunch
with some people from the Center for State and Local Govern-
ment. Or at least with some people who said they were from
the Center for State and Local Government. Speculation is
that they were really from the Trilateral Commission.
The second theory was the tenth amendment hadn't really
died at all. A student produced a copy of the National Lawyer
to support this theory. That rag had a story reporting that a
states' rights believer had seen the tenth amendment while
shopping in a K-Mart in Pass Christian, Mississippi. I had
trouble believing that, but my eye did catch the headline of an-
other story - "Harvard Law Review Invaded by Body Snatch-
ers" - that I wanted to read, so I set the tabloid aside. When I
read it later at lunch, it confirmed my worst suspicions about
the alien criteria used by elite law reviews in article selection.
But, hey, I'm not bitter.
Getting back to the class, the third theory was that the
tenth amendment was still there, only kinder and gentler than
before. A couple of students had found that, after Garcia, the
lower federal courts had used a canon of statutory interpreta-
tion to buffer core state functions from congressional power
grabbing. Seems that both the First 16 and the Eighth17 Circuits
have held that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act does not protect appointed state judges against state
mandatory retirement rules, even though the statute can be
16. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1988).
17. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 604 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 59
U.S.L.W. 3390 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1990) (No. 90-50).
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
read to do that. Both courts seemed moved by the absence of
any clear statement that Congress wished to intrude upon core
state functions. Federalism lives on, only now as an under-
enforced constitutional norm dressed up as a canon of statutory
interpretation. In other words, the tenth amendment got a new
name, fake papers, and diluted authority under the witness pro-
tection program.
The third theory carried the day. The students liked the
canon, even considering Garcia, and thought that it probably
reflected a reasonable respect for constitutional structure (not
to mention Blackmun's initial desire to find some middle
ground initially in National League of Cities).18
I reported this finding to the boss, and we closed the file on
the missing amendment, changing the names to protect the
innocent.
November 20, 1990. As always, I was working the day
watch out of Public Law Division. It was a beautiful fall day in
Minneapolis, and the leaves on the trees were so brilliant I felt
insecure. My name's still Frickey, and I'm still a law professor.
I didn't have any classes today, so I was digging into a back-
log of public law work. I had pulled the Missing Tenth Amend-
ment file because of new developments. The amendment may
be in for a comeback, with a vengeance.
As noted in the original file, two circuits had construed the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to allow
states to continue mandatory retirement policies for appointed
judges. Now another circuit had crossed them up. On the sur-
face, it looked like routine statutory interpretation, everyday
stuff for anybody working the Public Law Beat. But I smelled
a rat. The climate surrounding the ADEA problem had
changed, and not for the better. What had once just been an
interesting question of statutory interpretation had become ripe
for infiltration by organized public law subversives. So I
picked up the statute with some tweezers (you just don't touch
one of those suckers if you can help it), put it in a bag, and sent
it to the Public Law Lab for an analysis.
December 1, 1990. The lab report is back, right on time.
"Lab Report: Tenth Amendment Homicide Investigation
"In response to Frickey (Badge 4062) request of 12 Oct. 90.
18. 426 U.S. 833, 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Problem analyzed through regular research channels. Statute,
a/k/a ADEA, protects state and local government 'employees'
against being forced to retire at certain age.1 9 Definition of
'employee' contains exception for
any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision
of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by
such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on
the policymaking level or an immediate advisor with respect to the
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. 20
"Does not take high LSAT score, much less street sense, to
figure out that exception was drafted without thinking about
state judges. Sure, general language of first clause operates to
exclude elected state judges from ADEA. 21 But appointed
judges don't fit second clause, and hard to see them as appoin-
tees 'on the policymaking level,' which sounds like executive or
legislative branch stuff."
I stopped reading for a moment to clear my head of the
writing style, which reads the way a recent Russian emigre
talks. I had a laugh at the last sentence I had read. If you're
some kind of legal-realist-going-on-critical-legal-scholar the
conclusion that judges are not policymakers is laughable, but
laughable or not it would be hard to attribute that kind of per-
spective to Congress. In fact, most of the time it's hard to attri-
bute any perspective to Congress.
To summarize, the report told me, in ever more irritatingly
terse language, that the forensics yield no clear answers. Two
district courts had gotten out their dictionaries and taken the
literal approach to this ADEA exemption, concluding that the
statute does cover appointed judges.22 Along with the First and
Eighth Circuit decisions mentioned earlier in the file, the lab
discovered that two state supreme courts23 and one federal dis-
19. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). The states are employers as defined by the
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988), and application of the ADEA to the states
was held constitutional in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
21. The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has inter-
preted the first clause as also exempting state judges who are appointed by the
governor or legislature and then must stand before the voters for retention or
rejection. See Ashcroft, 898 F.2d at 600 n.3; Diamond v. Cuomo, 70 N.Y.2d 338,
342, 514 N.E.2d 1356, 1358, 520 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (1987), appeal dismissed, 486
U.S. 1028 (1988).
22. See EEOC v. Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Vt. 1989); Schlitz v.
Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330, 334 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43
(4th Cir. 1988).
23. See Apkin v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 401 Mass. 427, 436, 517
N.E.2d 141, 146 (1988); In re Stout, 521 Pa. 571, 583, 559 A.2d 489, 495 (1989).
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
trict court24 had held that appointed judges were not protected
against mandatory retirement by the statute. The canon that
intrusions into core state functions require clear evidence of
congressional intent 25 will get you to this nonliteral result
pretty well, and does account for the otherwise missing tenth
amendment. You can also fire two other canons in support of
this result - the ones that say courts should interpret statutes,
where plausible to do so, to avoid absurd results and to avoid
serious doubts about constitutionality.26
The lab report stressed that if there is anything left of state
sovereignty as a buffer against federal intrusion - and Garcia
may suggest there is27 - it certainly ought to raise serious
doubts about Congress's ability to mandate personnel policies
for appointed state judges. I mean, appointed judges aren't ex-
actly a Carolene28 group or anything. Of high state officials,
they have both the most job protection and the least restric-
tions on their exercises of power. Besides, if the states aren't
allowed to retire their judges, the next generation in the legal
community might not have a chance to make mistakes, too.
Getting there by the canons is extra fun, because it adds a jocu-
lar thrust-and-parry to the analysis.29 Moreover, the canons
have made sort of a scholarly comeback. Some modern writers
contend that the canons perform useful roles in statutory inter-
pretation,30 particularly in tying the interpretive process into
our overall public law traditions. 31
In sum, the lab report and my own instincts added up to
24. See EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 160 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
25. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
26. On these canons, see generally W. ESKRiDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 577-81, 676-89 (1988).
27. The Court in Garcia did not categorically rule out some federalism-
based limit on congressional power in this context. It stressed that "[tihese
cases do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the consti-
tutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under
the Commerce Clause," 469 U.S. at 556, and then quoted a passage from an
earlier decision concluding that the Court ought not speculate on how to han-
dle a hypothetical parade of horrible possibilities, id- (quoting New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946)).
28. Everybody knows.
29. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.
395, 401-06 (1950).
30. See Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1017-61 (1989); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 407, 451-62 (1989).
31. See Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
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pretty much the same thing. Maybe Congress should be able to
snuff out state autonomy, but our tradition of federalism sug-
gests that courts should not assume extreme federal interven-
tion without a clear congressional mandate. Anyway, it's silly
to think that Congress really wants state appointed judges to
have federally mandated life tenure, especially when a literal
interpretation of the statute does not give similar tenure to
elected judges.
The distinction that a literal interpretation of the ADEA
draws between appointed and elected judges is a dog that just
won't hunt. Judges who stand for retention elections are con-
sidered elected judges for this purpose.3 2 At least these elected
judges have almost the same job security as judges appointed
with life tenure, because judges rarely lose retention elections.
But if election is to be a critical distinction, the statute has
everything backwards. From the standpoint of democratic val-
ues, voters ought to be allowed to re-enlist the superannuated
judge if they wish. So I come out wondering if there is even a
rational basis to support the distinction apparently drawn on
the face of the ADEA. All my years on the beat were telling
me that Congress had drafted the statute without considering
state judges at all.
Principles of federalism and common sense suggest, then,
that we ought to resist literalism here unless no plausible inter-
pretation to the contrary can be constructed. Accordingly,
although "on the policymaking level" in the statute seems on
its face to contemplate executive branch or legislative branch
activity, it isn't much of a stretch to apply it to the judiciary,
too. After all, judges make policy not just in judicial decisions,
but frequently in other ways as well (in administering the
courts, adopting rules of procedure, and so on).
But the lab uncovered a recent circuit opinion adopting the
literal approach,33 setting up a split in the circuits on the issue.
The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari on the issue.
3 4
Call it a hunch, but my instincts were telling me that the com-
bination of state sovereignty and the various interpretive ca-
nons could create a truly explosive opinion, with state
609, 632-66 (1990); Frickey, Congressional Intent Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1139, 1129 (1990).
32. See supra note 15.
33. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990).
34. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 59
U.S.L.W. 3053 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1990) (No. 90-50).
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sovereignty winning in a back-alley shootout that destroys
much of utility and interest in statutory interpretation.
I thought I'd better try out my instincts on another exper-
ienced officer, so I called up my sometime partner and asked
him to meet me at the diner where they give us free food.
When Dan arrived, we ordered cups of the mud that passes for
java at that dive, and then I laid out the scenario. I told him it
was just a guess, because I had no stoolie at the Court to lean
on, but that my gut told me the worst could happen.
Led by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court is increasingly
bowing down before the god of literalism in statutory interpre-
tation.35 With the zeal of a convert, Justice Kennedy recently
suggested that literalism ought to trump well-established and
(at least often) sensible canons of interpretation. In Public Cit-
izen v. United States Department of Justice,36 a majority of the
Court applied the absurd-result and constitutional-doubts ca-
nons3 7 to avoid interpreting the Federal Advisory Committee
Act38 to require public disclosure of the proceedings of the
American Bar Association committee that advises the President
on the qualifications of potential federal judicial nominees.
Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor) concurred only in the judgment and presented a lit-
eralist attack on the majority opinion.3 9
Kennedy contended that the absurd-result canon should be
applied only when "the result of applying the plain language
would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite im-
possible that Congress could have intended the result... , and
where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most
anyone."40 Similarly, Kennedy argued that the constitutional-
doubts canon
should not be given too broad a scope lest a whole new range of gov-
ernment action be proscribed by interpretive shadows cast by consti-
tutional provisions that might or might not invalidate it. The fact that
a particular application of the clear terms of a statute might be uncon-
stitutional does not provide us with a justification for ignoring the
plain meaning of the statute.41
35. See, e.g., Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990);
Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990).
36. 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
37. See supra note 20.
38. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988).
39. Justice Scalia did not participate in the decision.
40. 109 S. Ct. at 2575 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
41. Id. at 2580.
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Kennedy interpreted the advisory committee statute as apply-
ing to the ABA committee, and then concluded that this appli-
cation of the statute violated the separation of powers, by
unduly interfering with the President's authority to appoint
justices.42
The question whether the ADEA covers appointed state
judges seems to fit the Kennedy approach. Read literally, the
ADEA exception for appointees "on the policymaking level"
does not seem to reach judicial decisionmaking. It is not ab-
surd, in the lay sense, to suppose that Congress would apply the
ADEA to appointed (but not elected) state judges. What Ken-
nedy seems to mean by "absurd" is "absurdist," like something
that Woody Allen would come up with, given some time -
such as a federal requirement that state judges wear party hats
while hearing eminent domain cases. Nor does the potentially,
unconstitutional application of a federal statute suggest to Ken-
nedy that some canon should be used to avoid considering the
question of constitutionality.
Because two Justices joined Kennedy in Public Citizen, he
would need only two more allies to take the same approach in
the ADEA case. Justice Scalia, as the fountainhead of the new
literalist approach,43 almost certainly agrees with this analysis.
Of these four Justices, two (Rehnquist and O'Connor) dissented
in Garcia on the ground that principles of federalism do pro-
vide substantial constitutional barriers to congressional regula-
tion of state functions." The other two (Scalia and Kennedy)
may well share that view. Thus, if Kennedy could find one
more vote, he could write a most remarkable opinion in the
ADEA case that would (1) cut back the absurd-result rule to
situations where the person on the street would find the inter-
pretation "Monty Python ludicrous"; (2) cut back the constitu-
tional-doubts canon so that it applied only where there was
substantial statutory textual ambiguity; (3) conclude that the
ADEA therefore did cover appointed state judges; and (4) hold
that this application of the federal statute was an unconstitu-
tional intrusion into core state functions, repudiating any incon-
sistent language in Garcia along the way. If Kennedy felt
especially ambitious, he could try to overrule Garcia (a 5-4
42. I& at 2580-84.
43. See supra note 29 and sources cited therein.
44. 469 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Powell, and Rehn-
quist, JJ.).
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case) entirely.45
A cold wind off the Mississippi River made me shudder.
Could there be one more vote for this approach? Four Justices
- White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens - have not shown
much affection for the new literalism. Moreover, afl four were
in the majority in Garcia and thus might not see a serious con-
stitutional problem even in the ADEA situation. That leaves
new Justice Souter.
"That's the scenario," I told Dan. He sat silently for a min-
ute, staring out the window at the broken urban landscape that
is Cleveland. This was puzzling because we were in Minneapo-
lis, but we had no time for other questions just then. Dan's
mind turned over the possibilities as he muttered some
thoughts to himself. "A piano wire job on the throat to the ca-
nons. A two-fer on literalism and the tenth amendment. And
the professionals in place to do it right." He turned silent again
and slowly turned over the coffee mud with his spoon a few
times. I swallowed some undissolved coffee creamer to cool my
stomach. My mind drifted to other apocalyptic events in public
law: the gutting of the fourteenth amendment between 1883
and 1896; the switch in time that saved nine; the demise of the
public-interest theory of regulation; the last time somebody
cited something I wrote. Finally, Dan looked me in the eye.
"Go with it," he said. "Try for a collar, if somebody can print it
before the Court gets the opinion out."
My thoughts drifted. It's about forty minutes into next
year's hit movie, "Mr. Souter Goes to Washington." I played
out the scene. The once-obscure rustic has been nominated and
confirmed to the High Court, and he has moved (ramshackle
house and all) to Georgetown, much to the displeasure of the
neighborhood. His law clerk, who looks like Jean Arthur, has
been trying to convince him to avoid the allure of the new liter-
alism. Souter, who seems to have grown in height and taken on
a resemblance to Jimmy Stewart, is standing behind the bench
amidst piles of mail from New Hampshire Boy Scouts inter-
ested in the ADEA case. He is talking in kind of a nasally voice
that sounds like Stewart, too:
45. In fairness, Kennedy had a legitimate beef in Public Citizen. The ma-
jority's construction of the statute at issue there is neither clear in itself nor
easily derived from statutory language. It is a good deal easier to construe "on
the policymaking level" to apply to state appointed judges. Thus, even Ken-
nedy might not apply his Public Citizen approach in the ADEA case, and even
if he did, he may find it hard to gain allies. Nonetheless, for the reasons ex-
plained above, the ADEA case is a tempting target for this method.
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I just can't see how anybody can be so gol-darned sure that words
mean in context what they might mean in the dictionary. Why, if I
tried that one out on the folks down the road back in New Hamp-
shire, they would a' thought I had spent too much time cooped up
with my books and not enough time with sensible people. You know,
this literalism stuff pretends to be mechanical and passive, but just
seems to free you up to do about anything you want. In New Hamp-
shire, we have a name for this kind of stuff; we call it "snake oil."
The law clerk cheers.
I look back down at the open file on the Missing Tenth
Amendment. Will Justice Souter first be underestimated by
some of his colleagues, then persecuted, and then finally
emerge a heroic figure like Senator Smith? Whatever happens,
in this case, it's impossible to change the names to protect the
innocent.

